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CASES NOTED
TORTS: EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
RESULTING IN PHYSICAL INJURY
Plaintiff-customer in defendaut's store sought damages for mental
suffering, emotional distress, and a resulting heart attack caused by the
insulting language of defendant's employee. Upon asking the price of an
item, plaintiff was told by the clerk, "If you want to know the price, you'll
have to find out the best way you can ... you stink to mc." rhe lower court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Held, affirmed,
in the absence of allegations "showing that the words were intended to have
real meaning or serious effect." SlocuIm v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So.2d 396
(Fla. 1958).
Throughout the development of the law of torts, courts generally have
been reluctant to grant compensation for interference with one's mental or
emotional tranquility as such. These courts have denied such recovery for
two principal reasons: first, they have feared that mental and emotional
disturbances are difficult to prove,2 and consequently, fraudulent litigation
would follow if they were to hold otherwise; 3 secondly, they have taken the
attitude that one should be impervious to insults, outrage and the like,4 for
if they encourage suits based thereon, the courts would become the arbiters
of petty, personal grievances." For these reasons traditional tort doctrine has
denied recovery to claims for mental or emotional distress, unless the claim
can be built upon an existing, independent tort.6 Vhere there has been an
I. Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948); Halliday v. Cien-
kowski, 333 Pa. 123, 3 A.2d 372 (1939); Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d
81 (Mun. App. D.C. 1946); Lynch v. Knight 11861] 9 H.L. Cas. 577; 52 Am, Jun.
Torts § 45, n. 10 (1944); Anuot., 15 A.L.R.2d 108 (1951); Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Prosser,
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering : A New Tort, 37 Mic. L. REv. 874 (1939).
2. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wood, 57 Fed. 371 (5th Cir. 1893); BOHLEN,
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 255 (1926).
3. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wood, supra note 2; Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R.
Co, 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45
N.E. 354 (1996); 52 Am. Jur. Torts § 51, n, 20 (1944); Prosser, supra note 1, 875;
But cf., Address by Professor Lambert, in 1955 NACCA CLEVELANn CONVENTON PRo-
CEEDINCS, at 549.
4. Western Union '['el. Co. v. Wood, 57 Fed. 471 (5th Cir. 1893); International
Ocean 'Ie]. Co. v. Saunders, 32 FIa. 434, 14 So. 148 (1893); Magruder, supra note 1,
at 1035; Prosser, sura note 1, at 877, 879-80.
5. Western Union 'l'el. Co. v. Wood, sutra note 4; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,
151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Prosser, supra note I at 877.
6. 52 Am. JuR., Torts §67. n. 14 (1944); RESTATEMIFNT, T'orts §47 (1934),
Magruder, supra unote I at 1058; Prosser, supra note I at 879.
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assault,' battery,8 false imprisonment, 9 trespass,' and the like, damages
awarded for mental and emotional disturbance are said to be "parasitic""
to recovery for the recognized tort on which the suit is based."' In the
absence of such tortious conduct for which recovery is granted, the individual
factual situation of each case is usually the determining factor.
Decisions involving mental and emotional distress may for convenience
be grouped into four categories. First, where negligence causes the distress
unaccompanied by physical injury, courts have experienced the least difficulty
in denying recovery.1 - The vast majority of cases has denied recovery in this
situation.' 4 One of the main obstacles has been the failure of most courts
to find a legal duty on the part of the defendant not to interfere with the
plaintiff's peace of mind.'5 As an example, the defendant negligently tipped
the burial casket of plaintiff's next-of-kin off a truck so that it broke open
and disarranged and bruised the corpse in her view. The court denied plain-
tiff compensation for the emotional distress which resulted.', The addition
of an accompanying or resulting physical injury to the distress distinguishes
the second category from the first. The old general rule denied recovery in
this event,' 7 the courts reasoning that since they granted no relief for fright,
shock or distress alone, there could be none for their consequences.' 8 During
the last fifty years American courts have extended relief for the negligent
infliction of physical injuries through shock to the emotions, so that today
the majority of American jurisdictions, as well as England, would grant
7. Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9 (1902); lloldorf v. Holdorf, 185 Iowa
838, 169 N.W. 737 (1918); 'I'Trogden v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916);
Leach v. Leach, 33 S. V. 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
8, Bethurum v. Krumm, 109 Cal. App. 5. 292 Pac. 287 (1930); Interstate Life
& Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S. W. 458 (1937); Williams v. Under-
hill, 63 App. Div. 223, 71 N.Y. Stipp. 291 (1901); Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21
N.W. 527 (1884).
9. Gadsden Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925); Great
Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S.W. 2d 759 (1939); Talcott v. National
Exhibition Co., 144 App. Div. 337, 128 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (1911).
10. Dawsey v. Newton, 244 Ala. 661, 15 So.2d 271 (1943); Lyons v. Smith, 176
Ark. 728, 3 S.W. 2d 982 (1928); XVhitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916);
Bouillon v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 148 Mo. App. 462, 129 S.W. 401 (1910).
11. Magruder, supra note 1 at 1038, 1049; 1 STREET, "I'HE FouNDATIONS OF LEGAL
LIABILITY 470 (1906).
12. Authorities cited note 6 supra.
13. United States v. Irambleton, 185 F.2d 564 (C.A.9th Wash. 1950); Herrick v.
Evening Express Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 Atl. 16 (1921); Spade v. Lynn & Boston
R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,
45 N.E. 354 (1896).
14. 52 Am. 1uR. Torts §48 (1944); Annot's., 23 A.L.R. 361 (1923); 44 A.L.R.
428 (1926); 56 A.L.R. 657 (1928).
15. Wilcox v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 52 Fed. 264 (4th Cir. 1892); Smith v.
Gowdy, 196 Ky. 281, 244 S.W. 678 (1922); Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177
N.E. 431 (1931).
16. Nichols v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 94 Vt. 14, 109 AtI. 905 (1919).
17. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Waube v.
Warrington, 216 WNis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, 147 Pa. 40,
23 AtI. 340 (1892); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §46 (1934).
18. Braun v. Craven, 175 11. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Mitchell v. Rochester,
supra note 17; Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 Aft. 4 (1909);
Waube v. Warrington, sura note 17.
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recovery therefor in a proper case.' Cases affording such relief have gen-
erally turned upon an undue probability of bodily harm '0 to the plaintiff as
a consequence of the defendant's reckless2' actions. One of the first American
cases holding a defendant liable in this second category is Hill Y. Kimball,2 -
wherein the defendant caused the plaintiff's wife to suffer a miscarriage
when lie attacked two persons on the plaintiff's land, the affray being char-
acterized by much profanity and bloodshed. Where the aggrieved has suf-
fered physical injury in addition to mental or emotional distress, the majority
of courts now recognize such claims under certain circumstances, 23 whereas
relatively few jurisdictions make a practice of awarding compensation to one
who alleges a negligently inflicted mental or emotional disturbance alone. 24
In the third and fourth categories, the emotional or mental distress is
intentionally caused by the acts or words of the defendant. Even where, as
in the third category, the distress is intentionally caused but not accompanied
by physical injury, the majority of cases during the last century has denied
compcnsation. "-5" Recovery was denied where the plaintiff suffered humiliation
and distress as a result of the defendant's foreman's acts in discharging her.
The foreman had exclaimed in an insulting and menacing manner, in the
presence of other employees, "Get your G-- D-- Time"; and, "Yes, I am
talking to old lady Atkinson, G-- 1)-- You." 26 Case law during the last twenty
five y'ears has established a strong, contrary trend. -27  It precipitated the
change28 ill the 1948 Restatement of Torts, rejecting any necessity for phy-
sical injury:
19. Armour v. Kollocyer, 161 Fed. 78 (8th Cir. 1908); Mitnick v. Whalen Bros.,
Inc., 115 Conn. 650, 163 Atl. 414 (1932); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165
Atl. 182 (1933); lninbrook v. Stokes Bros. [C.A. 1925] 1 K.B. 141; Magruder, supra
note 1, at 1036.
20. Bowman v. Williams, supra note 19; Purcell v. St. Paul City R.R. Co., 48
Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Hunter v. Southern R.R. Co., 152 N.C. 682, 68
S. W. 237 (1910); Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., supra note 19; 2 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs
§436 (1934).
21. Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 At]. 273 (1927); Price v. Yellow Pine
Paper Mill Co.; 240 SV. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); 2 RFsrA'rEFxNT, TORTS §500
(1934); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAiL.REv. 40, 54 (1956).
22. 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
23. Cases cited note 19 suvra.
24. Authorities cited note 14 supra.
25. Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612 (1916); Clark v. Associated Retail
Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210
N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936); Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135 P.2d 330
(1943); Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 TexI 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954); 52 Am. Jua.
Torts §45, n. 12 (1944); Annot's., 23 A.L.R. 361 (1923); 44 A.L.R. 428 (1926); 56
A.L.R. 657 (1928); Magruder, supra note 1 at 1035.
26. Atkinson v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 50 Ga. App. 434, 178 S.E. 537 (1935).
27. Savage v. Boics, 77 Ark. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n v. Silznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Curnutt v. Wolf, 244 Iowa
683, 57 N.V, 2d 916 (1953); Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W.
25 (1932); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
28. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §46 (1934).
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One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes
emotional distress to another is liable
Sa) for such emotional distress, and
b) for bodily harm resulting from it.29
The primary factors considered by these recent cases in granting recovery for
emotional distress (or mental suffering) alone are: (I ) the severity of the
distress and the reasonableness thercof,30 and (2) the outrageousness of the
defendant's conduct."' If both are found to be present to a high degree, the
claimant probably has an excellent chance of recovery in the majority of
American jurisdictions today.
In the fourth category, where a physical injury results from an intention-
ally caused shock to the emotions, the vast majority of courts that have
expressed themselves on this point have granted relief, particularly where the
defendant's actions are reckless or outrageous.3 2 Exceptions to the old rule
denying recovery for emotional distress and its consequences became evident
as an increasingly large number of cases allowed recovery without requiring
the aggrieved to fit his claim into a recognized tort action., Even from the
earliest times practical jokers have been held responsible for the "intentional
subjection of another to nervous pressures calculated to cause physical
injury."3 4 The same result has followed where creditors have used excessive
means to collect a debt a5 and where threats have caused one to fear for his
personal safety.36
Those engaged in operating a public utility or other business devoted to
public interests, such as common carriers 7 and inn-keepers 8 have con-
sistently been held responsible to patrons utilizing their facilities for gross
insults which reasonably offend them. The foundation case in this field
29. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §46 (Snpp. 1948).30. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §46 (Supp. 1948); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL.
L. R .v. 40, 52 (1956).
31. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL L. REv. 40. 53 (1956).
32. Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906); Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 198 P.2d 696 (1948); Brownback v. Frailey, 78 Ill. App. 262 (1898);
Prosser, supra note 31, at 41.
33. Cases cited note 27 supra; Prosser. suora note 31. at 41.
34. Nickerson v. Hodges. 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920); Great Ati. & Pac. TeaCo. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 Atl. 22 (1931); Wilkinson v. Downtown, [18971 2QB. 57.
35. Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D,C. Cir. 1939); Barnett
v, Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); Cyran v. Finlay Straus,Inc., 302 N.Y. 486, 99 N.E.2d 298 (1951).
36. Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Hunter v.Southern Rv. Co., 152 N.C. 682, 68 S.E. 237 (1910); Dulieu v. White & Sons [19011
2 K.B. 669; Janvier v. Sweeny, 119191 2 KB. 316.
37. Humphrey v. Michigan United Ry., 166 Mich. 645, 132 N.W. 447 (1911);Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 178 N.Y. 347, 70 N.E. 857 (1904); Braswell v.Stokes, 191 S.C. 482, 5 S.E.2d 173 (1939); Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, 103 Tenn.
376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899).
38. Emmke v. DeSilva, 293 Fed. 17 (8th Cir. 1923); Milner Hotels, Inc. v. Dough-
erty, 195 Miss. 718, 15 So.2d 358 (1943); DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E.527 (1908); But cf., Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81 (D.C. App. 1946).
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affected with public interest is Chamberlain v. Chandler," wherein the
captain of a ship insulted and mistrcatcd his passengers. While this and
other early cases in this field were decided partly upon a contractual basis,
modcrn decisions are based upon, and emphasize, an especially high duty of
decent treatment on the part of those who hold themselves out to the public
on a monopolistic basis.10 Not only was this 'public utility' rule a departure
from old tort doctrine, but it also renains a liberalization of tie present rule
in that a less severe emotional disturbance produced by less outrageous
conduct generally is sufficient for recovery. 41 Since the turn of the century
this rule has been extended in some cases to the owners and operators of
theaters,42 amusement parks 43 and, most recently, telegraph offices."
Some cases have granted recovery for insult alone,45 whereas others
have denied recovery if the insulting language or conduct falls short of
extreme outrage.46 In a casc involving an insult similar to that of the instant
case, the defendant street car company was held liable where its conductor
referred to the plaintiff as she was getting off the car as "a big, fat woman." 41
The court stated:
The language used by the defendant's employee was humiliating
and mortifying to a sensible woman, and defendant did not give to
plaintiff that care and respectful consideration and attention which
it, as a common carrier, owed her while she was using its car, and is
responsible in damages for the annoyance and injured feelings
caused to plaintiff through the fault of its employee .... "
In the absence of an application of this 'public utility' doctrine, most cases
demand in order to grant recovery that the insult be intolerable, outrageous
or beyond all bounds of human decency.ia For this reason, cases involving
39. 5 Fed. Cas. 413, No. 2,575 (C.C. Mass. 1823).
40. Payne v. McDonald, 150 Ark. 12, 233 S.W. 813 (1921); Cole v. Atlanta &
West Point R.R. Co., 102 Ga. 474, 31 S.E. 107 (1897); DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y.
397, 86 N.E. 527 (1908); Prosser, supra note 31, at 59.
41. Compare Nance v. Mayflower ',avern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944)
with Kirstein v. Hotel Taft Corp., 183 Misc. 713, 51 N.Y. Snpp. 2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
42. Interstate Amusement Co. v. Martin, 8 Ala. App. 481, 62 So. 404 (1913);
Saenger Theatres Corp. v. llerudon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938).
43. Malczewski v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 156 La. 830, 101 So. 213 (1924);
Davis v. Tacoma R.R. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209 (1904).
44. Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 SE. 189 (1907);
Btchanan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 115 S.C. 433, 106 S.E. 159 (1920); compare
VcstCrn Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930).
45. Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907); Mal-
czewski v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 156 La. 830, 101 So. 213 (1924); Voss v.
Bolzenius, 147 Mo. App. 375, 128 S.\V. 1 (1910); Davis v. Tacoma R.R. & Power Co.,
35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209 (1904).
46. Davis v. Richardson, 76 Ark. 348, 89 S.W. 318 (1905); Shepard v. Lamphier,
84 Misc. 498, 146 N.Y. Supp. 745 (S. Ct. 1914); Flowers v. Price, 190 S.C. 392, 3
S.E. 2d 38 (1939); Wallace v. Shoreharn Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81 (Mun. App. D.C.
1946).
47. Haile v. New Orleans R.R. & Light Co., 135 La. 229, 65 So. 225 (1914).
48. Id. at 231, 65 So. at 226.
49, RFsrrT.n,%r, TorTS §46, comment g (Supp. 1948); Magruder, supra note 1,
at 1058; Prosser, supra note 31, at 44; But cf., Vallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49
A.2d 81, 83 (Mun. App. D.C. 1946).
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the alleged liability of restaurants, shops and other mercantile establishments
have generally required a higher degree of insult or offensive conduct.5 0
Two important trends must be kept in mind: first, the over-all extension
of liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress; and second,
the specific extension of the 'public utility' rule to other businesses dealing
with the public.
In the instant case, the court correctly recognized the "central problem"
as one concerning the rccognition of a new tort in this jurisdiction, the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 1 While acknowledging that the case
is one of first impression in Florida, the court admits, after reviewing the
authorities, that there is a "strong current of opinion in support of such
recognition." 52 The court first pointed out that under the decision in Kirksey
v. Jernigan,53 recovery has been allowed in this state for emotional distress
even in the absence of physical injury. In the Kirksey case, the defendant
refused to turn over to the plaintiff the body of her child which he allegedly
cmbalned without authorization and kept until the plaintiff paid a large
fee. In its opinion the court stated:
There can be no recovery for mental pain and anguish unconnected
with physical injury in an action arising out of the negligent breach
of a contract whereby simple negligence is involved. Dunahoo v.
Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541 ....
But we do not feel constrained to extend this rule to cases
founded purely in tort, where the wrongful act is such as to reason-
ably imply malice, or where from the entire want of care of atten-
tion to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights
of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assess-
ment of exemplary or punative damages.5 4
The court then discounted as a bar to recovery under the facts of the instant
case, the court's language in Mann v. Roosevelt Shop,55 wherein the plaintiff
sued in an action in slander the defendant whose employee, while refusing
to serve her, exclaimed: "You are not as good as a Negro .. .. " In denying
recovery for slander, the court stated: "The case at bar presents a case of
gross insult; however, the law affords no redress for insult alone."56 In dis-
tinguishing that case from the instant case, the court said: "But that language
(above quoted) was obviously confined to those cases where an attempt
is made to state an action in defamation for injury to reputation as opposed
to peace of mind. . . ."51 The court felt that, even if it assumed the new
50, Prosser, subra note 31, at 59-64.
51. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So.2d 396, 397 (Fla. 19581.
52. Ibid.
53. 45 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1950).
54. Id. at 189.
55. 41 So.2d 894 (Fla. 1949).
56. Ibid.
57. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So.2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1958).
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tort as established in Florida, the facts of the instant case would not justify
recovery thereunder. The court studied the Comments and Illustrations
pertinent to section 46 of the 1948 Restatement of Torts, and concluded
that the case does not qualify under those standards. It noted with obvious
satisfaction that most writers tend to believe that exremcly outrageous con-
duct is necessary for recovery, and more important, that all writers agree
that there has to be a line drawn somewhere below which liability will not
fall. In other words, the new tort doctrine should not protect parties against
all types of vulgarities, insults and bad manners. The court denied plaintiff
recovery for three reasons: (I) the degree of the insult was not sufficient
to make it actionable; (2) the plaintiff could not be brought under the
'public utility' rule, nor would the court extend this ever-expanding rule to
the case at bar; and (3) the plaintiff failed to allege and prove that the
"words were intended to have real meaning or serious effect." The court
seemed to rely primarily upon the second and third reasons listed above in
affirming the lower court's decision to dismiss the complaint.
Regarding the first reason, it is true that the defendant's employee's
conduct, i.e., his insulting language, was not sufficiently outrageous to warrant
recovery in light of most other cases dealing with ordinary mercantile estab-
lishments.58  The court concedes, however, that "the manner in which the
language is used . . . may determine its actionable character." 1" While the
language alone may not constitute a sufficiently outrageous insult, it remains
a question of fact whether the manner in which the insult was delivered was
sufficiently outrageous to constitute the requisite intention or recklessness.
Plaintiff received the insult in public when she was least expecting it. Under
the Restatement rule,(" it is not necessary that the bodily harm be forsceable
in any way. That the emotional shock was severe is evidenced by the result-
ing heart attack. There is no question but that the employee's unprivileged
conduct produced this severe emotional distress and the physical Injury.
In the second place, why should the defendant, a large supermarket, not be
liable as such when it could have been held liable if it had been a hotel or a
telegraph office? It does not appear reasonable to base recovery for injuries
resulting from such conduct solely upon the rationale of the public utility
rule. This rule originally was an exception to section 46 of the 1934 Restate-
ment of Torts. It is now only a rcfinement of the Restatement rule as
amended in 1948. Certainly the defendant's contacts with the public are as
numerous and just as important. Twenty years ago, Prosser stated: "There is
no apparent reason for limiting such liability to public utilities, and the same
,S. Republic hIon & Steel Co, v. Self. 192 Ala. 403,. 68 So. 328 (1915); Larson
v. R. B. Wrigley Co., 183 Mii. 28, 235 N.W. 393 (1931); Flowers v. Price, 190
S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38 (1939); Nancc v. Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d
773 (1944).
59. Slocurm v. Food Fair Stores. 100 So.2d 396. 398 (Fla. 1958).
60. RESTATMENT, TORTS §46 (Supp. 1948).
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result might be reached, in a proper case, as to any storekeeper.""' Finally,
the court's criterion that the plaintiff must allege that "the words were in-
tended to have real meaning or serious effect"' is both vague and misleading.
How is one to show that another intended any meaning? What on the other
hand shows a "serious effect" better than severe emotional illness accom-
panied by physical injury? Surely the plaintiff's allegations that the defend-
ant's conduct was either malicious or grossly reckless or done "with intent
to inflict great mental and emotional disutrbance . 6.3..",, should be sufficient
under recent decisions holding responsible those who exercise extreme disre-
gard for others and cause such injuries through reckless or outrageous con-
duct. The court's prescription for recovery is unrealistic in that the claims
stem from such multifarious situations. The more enlightened of the recent
cases have turned upon the following factors: (a) The conduct in general
should at least approach outrageousness or recklessness; (b) the emotional
illness should be severe and reasonable under all the circumstances; and
(c) if there is also physical injury, then recovery is all the more indicated.
The court failed to consider these factors sufficiently, particularly the last
one, in its first opportunity to recognize a right of recovery for intentionally
caused emotional distress.
JOHN P. CORRICAN, JR.
WILLS: SATISFACTION OF DEBT BY A LEGACY
TO CREDITORS
The testator, petitioners' father, collected income belonging to the
petitioners, which over a period of time, he allegedly commingled with his
own assets. No accounting was ever made by the father of the affairs which
he handled on behalf of his sons. He bequeathed stocks and securities and
devised real estate of unascertained value to the petitioners. The circuit
court presumed the legacy was given in satisfaction of the indebtedness, and
ordered an election between the legacy and the satisfaction of the debt by
an action of accounting.' Held, on certiorari, no presumption arises that
a legacy to a creditor satisfies the creditor's claim. Lopez v. Lopez, 96 So.2d
463 Fla. 1957).
The general rule of construction, or the doctrine of satisfaction,2 as it is
sometimes called, states that where a legacy is given to a creditor in an
61. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mich. L.
Rev. 874, 883 (1939).
62. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So.2d 396, 398 (Fla. 1958).
63. Id., at 397.
1. The choice is compulsory between two inconsistent fights or claims where there
is a clear intention by the testator that the beneficiary shall not enjoy both. 2 STORY,
EQulTy JURISPRUDENCE § 1451 (14th ed. 1918).
2. A distinction must be made between the doctrine of satisfaction which is
employed with reference to legacies to creditors and the doctrine of satisfaction used in
other phases of will construction. ATKINSON, WILLS § 133 (2nd ed. 1953).
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